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ESSAY

SEARCHING FOR AN
OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS:

A

SECULAR CARE ETHICS FEMINIST

RESPONDS TO RELIGIOUS FEMINISTS
EVA FEDER KIlTA Y*

I.

INTRODUCTION

I want to thank Elizabeth Schiltz for inviting me to participate in this
panel on Feminist Legal Theory: Dialogue Across Philosophical and Faith
Traditions and to present a secular feminist perspective. Now let me also
confess my anxiety in making these remarks in the presence of renowned
religious feminist scholars, here at St. Thomas Law School, a school that
stands in a revered tradition of Catholic law schools. But as it is the express
purpose of my presence on this panel to represent the secular feminist viewpoint, I will gather my courage and speak forthrightly. I will begin by situating myself, first vis-a-vis my secularism, and second with regard to my
concerns about care and dependency.
To begin then, a word about my secularism. By birth and culture I am
Jewish, and I cherish my cultural identity as a Jew. But somewhere along
the way, I decided not to pursue a religious education, and so I am not even
well-versed (sometimes to my own dismay) in the tradition of the religion
into which I was born. If I have any religious faith, I'd say it is that of a
Spinozist. Spinoza was the great seventeenth century philosopher who argued that God is a single substance, fully immanent and fully in all things,
past, present and future as all things are aspects of that single substance. 1
This is not a transcendent God, and it is not a personal God. One might say
that this is a conception of God as a sustaining presence. It is not a God one
approaches through prayer and ritual, but through understanding. Spinoza
argued that the road to happiness lies in a life lived with goodness, tolerance and one in which we strive for what he called an "intellectual love of
*
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God" (amor intellectualis Dei).2 Such an understanding leads us to treat our
fellow beings well and allows us to understand our humble, finite position
in an infinite universe. But Spinoza also believed that this was not a road
for everyone, and that there were other ways for others to achieve peace,
goodness and harmony. His was one of the most persuasive voices for religious tolerance and freedom of thought.
The remarks I will be making today come from my perspectives as a
philosopher, a feminist and also the mother of a young woman (not so
young now ... she is thirty-seven) who has "severe to profound" mental
retardation. Having such a child-such a person-in my life has placed me
at odds with many accepted dogmas in the dominant Western philosophical
tradition. I really do welcome the writings of religious feminists who emphasize love, care and human vulnerability, an emphasis that stands in contrast to an often constricting and obsessive valuing of the human capacity
for rationality. Contrast the conception of dignity that predominates in philosophy with the one dominant in religious traditions. Philosophical treatments of human dignity tend to be based on our ability to reason. Human
dignity as conceived within religious traditions derives from the idea that
we are all created in the divine image, that we are all children of God.
While I feel an affinity to attributions of dignity that are not based on the
capacity for reason, I don't think that appeal to a personal deity is the only
alternative. In other work, I have argued for a notion of dignity grounded in
the care humans are both able to give and receive, not, if you will, in the
idea that we are all children of God, but a secular analogue, the idea that we
are all "some mother's child."3
In my advance reading of the papers just presented, and again while
hearing them today, I have been struck by a paradox. Religious faith has
motivated some of the most important advances in liberalism. Abolitionists,
in their opposition to slavery, were frequently motivated by religion. 4
Among the arguments for the equality of the sexes, there have been powerful ones that claim sex equality is supported by a proper reading of the
2. See id. at 259-60.
3. See Eva Feder Kittay, Equality, Dignity and Disability, in PERSPECTIVES ON EQUALITY:
THE SECOND SEAMUS HEANEY LECTURES 93 (Mary Ann Lyons & Fionnuala Waldron eds., 2005);
see also Eva Feder Kittay, Disability, Equal Dignity and Care, 2 CONCILIUM: INT'L J. FOR THEOLOGY 105 (2003).
4. See, e.g., ANTHONY BENEZET, OBSERVATIONS ON THE INSLAVING, IMPORTING AND
PLRCHASING OF NEGROES; WITH SOME ADVICE THEREON (Germantown, Christopher Sower
1760), reprinted in EARLY AMERICAN IMPRINTS, SERIES I (American Antiquarian Society & NewsBank 2002); JONATHAN EDWARDS, THE INJUSTICE AND IMPOLICY OF THE SLAVE TRADE, AND OF
THE SLAVERY OF THE AFRICANS (New Haven, Thomas and Samuel Green 1791), reprinted in
EARLY AMERICAN IMPRINTS, SERIES I (American Antiquarian Society & NewsBank 2002); BENJAMIN LAY, ALL SLAVE-KEEPERS THAT KEEP THE INNOCENT IN BONDAGE ... (Philadelphia, Benjamin Lay 1737), reprinted in EARLY AMERICAN IMPRINTS, SERIES I (American Antiquarian Society
& NewsBank 2002).
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Bible. s Clergy such as the Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. were responsible for advancing civil rights in the United States. And yet religious
faiths of all sorts have, in certain periods and in certain places, also been at
odds with a liberal progressive politics, a politics based on the equality of
all human beings. At times and still today, we find religious views that
promote the subordination of certain groups in favor of others; religious
fervor has incited nations, groups and individuals to commit what, I think
everyone in this room would agree, were grave injustices.
My own attitudes toward the mixing of religion with political and social issues reflect an ambivalence-and it is indeed a bivalence-for there
are two competing sets of values. There is, on the one hand, a true appreciation of the deep religious faith that gave people like Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. and the Freedom Riders the courage to withstand the beatings and
abuse heaped on them by segregationists-to face violence with non-violence not only because they believed in the justice of their cause, but also
because they possessed the strength of their faith. I hold, on the other hand,
a deep suspicion of those who think that the truth of their own faith is
sufficient to justify determining how others (whether of their own faith or
not) should live their lives.
Yet even in the actions of those I admire we see the infusion of politics
with religion and religion with politics. It has never been entirely clear to
me why I take such a different attitude toward some faith-based politics,
such as those favored by the administration of George W. Bush, and those
of a person like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The Christian faithfuls who
struggled to end slavery and segregation also believed that the truth of their
belief was sufficient reason to compel believers and nonbelievers alike to
behave in ways they believed to be right.
II.

A

REASONABLE OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

In the end, perhaps, the difference in how I view the role of religion in
social and political life has more to do with the causes in whose name religion is summoned than in the part played by religion as such. While I might
not share the Christian faith of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., I believe that
what he fought for was right. That the strength to struggle was found in
religious belief makes me admire the strength of the motivating source. But
again the admiration would be tempered if I did not profoundly agree with
the mission. Such strength of religious devotion directed, for instance, to
maintaining women's subordinate position, I find frightful, not admirable.
What someone like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and a secular Jew such as
myself share is a belief in the inherent equal worth of each human being,
5. See generally THE PuBLIC YEARS OF SARAH AND ANGELINA GRIMKE: SELECTED WRIT(Larry Ceplair ed., 1989) for a wonderful example of the appeal to Christian teachings as
applied both to the question of slavery and the equality of the sexes.
INGS
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male or female, black, brown or white. King might have justified his belief
by appealing to one God that created all his children equal. I would justify it
differently-without religious underpinnings. Indeed, I might just take it as
axiomatic. But King and I share, what the philosopher John Rawls calls, an
overlapping consensus. 6 A reasonable overlapping consensus is that shared
set of values of a political liberalism, which allows people with different
comprehensive conceptions of the good within a pluralist society to live
together and to exercise liberty of thought and of conscience.
Let me just speak briefly about the notion of "conceptions of the
good." I, at times during the discussion here, heard the phrase "conception
of the good" eliding into whatever choices bring people pleasure? When we
speak of a conception of the good, philosophers are not referring to those
things that necessarily give us pleasure-certainly not simply momentary
pleasures. A conception of the good, or as Rawls says, "comprehensive
conceptions of the good," signifies a comprehensive religious, moral or
philosophical doctrine or perspective. 8 It means conceptions of what you
take a good, meaningful life to be, a set of beliefs that may be secular or
tied to religious faith.9 When Rawls, in particular, speaks of a comprehensive conception of the good he also does not intend to signify "that anyone's vision of the good is as valid as any other."10 Rawls speaks of a
"reasonable" conception of the good, by which he means to exclude those
conceptions, which do not adhere to the ideas that allow for the freedom
and equality of all and that are intolerant of other's right to live their lives
according to their own conception of the goodY Certainly, feminists are
unwilling to tolerate the idea that "anyone's vision of the good is as valid as
any other," because they do not think it is acceptable to adhere to doctrines
that promote the subordination of women. While Rawls, and feminists
alike, are open to a plurality of conceptions of the good, they do not endorse
6. JOH~ RAWLS, Part Two: Political Liberalism: Three Main ideas, in POLITICAL LIBER·
ALISM 131 (1993).
7. Susan J. Stabile, Can Secular Feminists and Catholic Feminists Work Together to Ease
the Conflict Between Work and Family?, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.1. 343,437 (2007).
8. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 174-76.
9. What I find odd in Professor Stabile's statement is that she cites as a support "language
from Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,851 (1992) that 'the right to define oue's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life' is at the 'heart
of liberty.'" Stabile, supra note 7, at 437 (citing Teresa Stanton Collett, independence or interdependence? A Christian Response to Liberal Feminists, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL
THOUGHT 178, 178 (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001 ». To speak of this as merely a matter
of "pleasure" is puzzling since many of the things that are most meaningful in our lives are not
matters of pleasure primarily, but have to do with our sense of responsibility and obligation, our
caring about the well-being of another, pride in accomplishment even when the achievement involves great difficulty and even pain, etc. Certainly Professor Stabile cannot be assuming that
anything that gives our life meaning that is not connected to a religious conviction is simply a
matter of what
us pleasure.
10. Stabile, supra note 7, at 437.
II. See RAWLS, supra note 6.
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just any conception of the good. Of course, a Catholic or Lutheran feminist
may be expected to believe that there is just one true conception of the
good, but as long as she does not try to suppress or diminish the expression
of other conceptions, there is no difficulty in maintaining the possibility that
we can identify an overlapping consensus among these feminists (or feminists of any other religious persuasion) and secular feminists.
To resume the point then, an overlapping consensus is that set of beliefs to which people who hold different conceptions of the good can all
adhere. These beliefs are open to public scrutiny, public deliberation and
public justification, what Rawls calls "public reason."12 Sometimes holding
fast to such an overlapping consensus means tolerating practices of others
to which we may have an aversion. By engaging in public reason and justification we can come to see why we may need to tolerate such practices.
For example, where religious tolerance is valued, an Orthodox Jew may
have to consent to pork being sold in a butcher shop in his neighborhood
and the Christian can neither compel the Jew to eat pork nor to go without
kosher meat. Behind what appears to be a mere modus vivendi, a sort of
reluctant "live and let live" attitude, is a shared belief in the free expression
of religious faith, along with a shared understanding that what one ingests
can be a part of one's most deeply held convictions. These beliefs belong to
a reasonable overlapping consensus. Thus, while an overlapping consensus
may appear to be a mere modus vivendi, what distinguishes it is an understanding that just as I wish to be able to make certain decisions about my
own life, so another deserves that same right, and, moreover, by granting
each other that right we recognize and respect one another. This understanding and willingness to respect another's right to her own conception of the
good is a part of what John Rawls calls "a sense of justice."13
Although the notion of a political liberalism based on such an overlapping consensus is not without problems (for instance, just how permissive
should we be about practices we do not endorse), 14 I do believe that the
conception of an overlapping consensus can help us as we consider what
secular feminists and religious feminists share and what separates us. Most
urgently, it can help us see if and how we can work together to promote
policies that will advance the interests of women and their dependents-and
in the context of this conference-how we can work together to promote
better policies with respect to work and family life.

12. [d. at 212-13.
13, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971).
14. Susan Okin, for instance, has offered a critique of the conception arguing that many
doctrines that are prominent and historically dominant conceptions of the good are too frequently
ones that endorse beliefs undermining women's status as equals. See Susan Moller Okin, Political
Liberalism, Justice, and Gender, 105 ETHICS 23 (1994). John Rawls replies to Okin in John
Rawls, The idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765 (1997).
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Now, I noticed as Sister Allen was speaking today about integral gender complementarity, that she made an appeal to different ways of underpinning the idea of complementarity, even invoking physics. 15 Attempting
to justify a belief to others in this manner, even when you may have come
to hold a belief as part of your own faith, is itself an exercise of public
reason. It is an effort to justify your belief in terms acceptable to those who
do not share your comprehensive conception of the good. Later in the paper
I propose that the idea of integral gender complementarity, as Sister Allen
employs it to define marriage and the basis of an intergenerational family,
does not in fact belong to an overlapping consensus, and suggest that if it
once did, it no longer does. But what is important to the point at hand is that
Sister Allen, in putting forth the idea in a way in which it may have a
justification outside the bounds of Catholic theology, is engaging in a public deliberation that recognizes a plurality of comprehensive doctrines. She
is effectively saying that you can maintain different comprehensive doctrines and still find the idea of complementarity persuasive.
What I am hoping to point out is that as feminists who come from
different religious and secular perspectives, we can nonetheless try to convince one another through such appeals. We can also air and discuss the
different motivations that drive us to promote certain policies. If we can
agree that we hold to shared beliefs even if we are motivated by different
comprehensive doctrines, that we can justify these beliefs in terms that
others of us can accept, then we can find (or forge) an overlapping consensus. In our case, we are not looking for an overlapping consensus to support
political liberalism as much as we seek an overlapping consensus upon
which to work together as feminists for political and social reform.
To allow this to happen, secular feminists need to curb their suspicion
of the faith-based motivations of religious feminists and religious feminists
need to check their insistence on having hold of the deeper truths. These
only stand in the way. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. clearly believed that he
was fighting for civil rights because it is God's own truth, and he may well
have thought his is a deeper reason than the merely secular belief in equality. But that did not prevent secularists-Jewish atheists, lapsed Christians
and believing Jews-from participating in the Freedom Rides, marching on
Selma, and joining on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial; and it did not
prevent devoted Christians from accepting these brethren as part of the
struggle. If Catholic feminists invoke Pope John Paul II in arguing for equal
pay for equal work,16 I as a secular feminist can only be pleased that there
15. Sr. Prudence Allen, Address at the University of St. Thomas School of Law Symposium:
Workplace Restructuring to Accommodate Family Life (Mar. 16, 2007); see Sr. Prudence Allen,
Analogy, Law, and the Workplace: Complementarity, Conscience, and the Common Good, 4 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 343, 350 (2007).
16. See, e.g., Stabile, supra note 7, at 445 (stating that "John Paul II is clear on matters such
as women
equal pay for equal work").

474

UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:3

are such religious underpinnings for this demand-even if the Pope's proclamations, wise as they may be, are not the source of my own convictions. I
hope as well, that if I, as a secular care feminist, argue that the self is
relational, but do not embrace a notion of the relation of self to God, my
religious feminist sisters will hear this as a kindred notion, and not dismiss
it as a second-rate idea of relationality.

III.

SECULAR THEORETICAL GROUNDS FOR CAREIDEPENDENCY FEMINISM

Let me dwell for a moment on this thought, for it is one that Professor
Stabile points to in characterizing a difference between the Catholic feminist and the secular dependency or care feminist legal theorists. Although I
am not a legal theorist, I have a strong affinity to those Stabile includes
under that characterization!7 and so I feel compelled to address the difference to which Professor Stabile refers. She writes: "The latter [secular dependency or care feminist legal theorists] appears to view women's
relationality either as a matter of choice or 'as a critique of possessive individualism [more] than as a description of what men and women are actually
like.' "!!l But this is a misreading. To show the flaw in Professor Stabile's
interpretation, I will need to give a brief account of how the notion of a
relational self has taken hold in secular feminist theorizing.
Feminist psychoanalysts, especially Nancy Chodorow, have argued
that because women do most all the early mothering of infants and young
children, and as the construction of a self develops in part in relation to the
person who does that early nurturance, girls develop a more relational sense
of self-one that is not strongly differentiated from the mother-than do
boys, who, in establishing a gender identity are trying to differentiate themselves from that first love object for both girls and boys, the mother. 19 It is
in terms of this psychoanalytic model that the notion of a relational self first
took hold in feminist theory. Note that on this model, the self understanding
that develops is not a "matter of choice" nor a "reaction to individualist
conceptions of the self' except insofar as Chodorow recognized that the
work of nurturance requires a more relational understanding of self than is
used in most psychoanalytic theory or in political theory?O
Professor Stabile notes that "[o]ne important implication of relationality to others is that family (and marriage) and feminism are not mutually
exclusive ... [and that] feminism and sacrifice are not mutually exclu17. See id. at 435 (citing Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency. 8 AM. U. J. GErmER Soc. POL'y & L. 13 (2000);
CAROL GILLIGAN, Jr.,; A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender. 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (\989».
18. Id.
19. NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 77-9\ (1978); see also JESSICA BENJAMIN, THE BONDS OF LOVE: PSYCHOANALYSIS, FEMINISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF DOMINATION (1988).
20. CHODOROW, supra note 19. at 93, 110.
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sive."21 For secular feminist theory, the notion of relationality enters when
feminists investigate the nature of the self that engages in the work of nurturance, work that involves the giving over of oneself to fostering the wellbeing of another (what Professor Stabile is calling "sacrifice"). Carol Gilligan, in contrast to Chodorow, does not tie this relational self to a particular
psychoanalytic theory. Gilligan begins to articulate an entire moral perspective, one that has come to be known as a care ethic. 22 A care ethic is in fact
contrasted with the individualism that undergirds most modern theories of
justice. Insofar as one takes the moral fabric to be permeated by the value of
care, one construes oneself and others as selves that are always selves-inrelationship. That again is not a "choice"-at least not in the way that the
decision whether to brush my teeth with Colgate or Crest is a choice. Construing oneself as a relational self is a way to understand oneself as a social,
political and moral being.
Subsequent care feminists have gone further and argued that such an
understanding of the self more accurately articulates the nature of the self,
that the individualistic self is a mere fiction 23 or at best a self-understanding
pertinent only to very limited spheres of activity. Thinking of the self in
these relational terms requires a new understanding of autonomy and feminists have been articulating a relational autonomy.24
It is simply false to say, as Elizabeth Fox-Genovese writes in Feminism and the Unraveling of the Social Bond,
[secular] feminism rests upon the conviction that no one has the
right to tell a woman what to do - to abridge her right to selfdetermination or to compromise her absolute equality with men.
All the variants on feminism are thus united by a fierce commitment to individualism and equality, and all fundamentally reject
the notion of legitimate authority?5
Trne, secular feminists are united in fierce commitment to equality, but
not to individualism. True, secular feminists are united in a woman's right
to self-determination, but that is a far cry from thinking that "no one has a
right to tell a woman what to do." Feminists also recognize, more now
perhaps than ever, that equality does not mean sameness (to men or to one
21. Stabile, supra note 7, at 435.
22. Gll.LIGAN, supra note 17, at 73.
23. See EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDEI'CY (1999); see also Eva Feder Kittay, Whe1l Cari1lg Is Just a1ld Justice Is Cari1lg: Justice a1ld
Mental Retardatio1l, 13.3 PuB. CULTURE 557 (2001). This is my reading oflegal theorists such as
Martha Fineman and Robin West, and of feminist philosophers such as Annette C. Baier, The
Needfor More than Justice, i1l JUSTICE AND CARE 47 (Virginia Held ed., 1995); VIRGII'IA HELD,
THE ETHICS OF CARE: PERSONAL, POLITICAL, AND GLOBAL (2006); SARA ReDDICK, MATERNAL
THINKING (1989). These are just a few examples.
24. See generally RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMII'IST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY,
AGENCY, AND THE SOCIAL SELF (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, eds., 2000).
25. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Feminism and the Unraveling of the Social Bond, 19, no. 3
WOMEN FOR FAITH A:>ID FAMILY (2004), http://www.wf-f.org/04-3-Feminism.html.
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another)-if that is what Fox-Genovese means in referencing "her absolute
equality with men"26-and that setting up men as the norm against which
women measure themselves is often pernicious and undermines women's
efforts to develop their full potential. Indeed, some feminists argue instead
for the need of men to strive to be more like women in many regards. 27
Relationality is partly cashed out in relationships of dependency;
Martha Fineman and I both speak much about the "temporal dependency"
of our early years, periods of illness, disability and frail old age. Both of us
focus on these dependencies to examine aspects of social and political requirements in light of these inevitable and extensive dependencies. We each
draw on the idea that these dependencies encapsulate our fundamental condition as dependent beings living out our lives in inextricable interdependencies and inevitable dependencies. So the fundamental nature of
dependency is no more lost on us than on religious feminists.
The central difference I see between Catholic feminists and secular
care feminists on the issue of a relational self is that the former include the
idea that our selves bear a relationship to a personal God and that this relationship mediates the relationship between selves, and that our dependency
consists in these relationships. Here, secular feminists like myself and religious feminists do part company, and secular feminists use different theoretical, as well as empirical, resources to make the arguments about the
relationality of the self and the centrality of the concept of dependency.
That is, where the religious feminist finds support for her beliefs in her
religious conviction, the secular feminist is no less likely to look for good
support for her own positions in secular theorizing. Each ought to refrain
from an easy dismissal of the grounding principles of the other.
Let me take another example of the misreading of secular feminist
thought, one that occurs in Professor Failinger's paper when she says that
secular feminist care ethicists endorse care ethics because secular feminists
believe that women think that way and that this is sufficient justification to
say that it is the right way to think. 28 In fact, secular feminist theorists are
26. ld.; see Christine A. Littleton, Equality Across Difference: A Place for Rights Discourse? 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.r. 189 (1987); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality,
75 CAL. L. REV. 1279 (1987); see also ELIZABETH H. WOLGAST, EQt:ALlTY AND THE RIGHTS OF
WOMEN (1980).
27. See EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY. AND DEPENDENCY 1-19 (1999), for an articulation of the complex relationship feminists have to the concept
of equality. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW (1990), for more on how secular feminist theorists who do not approach feminism
through a care orientation deal with this question. See also CATHARINE A. MACKI!'!!'!ON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987).
28. "[FJeminists sometimes have difficulty explaining why contextual thinking is more likely
to gain purchase on the truth than abstract reasoning. Some seem almost to resort to the argument
that this is how women do think, and so it must be a valid way of understanding the world." Marie
A. Failinger, Women's Work: A Lutheran Feminist Perspective, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J., 343, 410
(2007).
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engaged in exploring what it is about contextuality that makes many think
that it serves as a better paradigm for explanation, knowledge claims, and
ethical deliberation. That women, in greater number then men, appear to
favor contextual thinking, construe their identity relationally, and make
moral decisions based on the ethical value of care is an empirical finding,
and, as an empirical finding it has also been contested?9 But feminist theorists who work on care ethics have been less committed to the empirical
finding and more interested in the importance of thinking through the validity, implications and new arenas in which the idea of a relational self and an
ethic based primarily on care may be relevant. 3o The attractiveness of a care
ethic and a relational understanding of the self derive not from the thought
that it reflects how women do ethics or think of the self (and this has never
been purported to be true of all women and no men). Instead it is a perspective that answers to a host of concerns that feminists have had, for example:
How does one think of ethical relationships between unequals? Why have
ethical and political theories been unresponsive to the concerns of dependents and those caring for dependents? How do we move beyond the excessive individualism that pervades our ethical and political theories as well as
the society in which we exist, and yet respect individual strivings and differences? What sorts of responsibilities do we have to vulnerable others?
Why does the egoism vs. altruism dichotomy seem so unsatisfactory? How
do we come to discern the needs of another? Are there universal needs that
are unaffected by historical and cultural difference or is all need contextually understood? These are but a few questions that promise to have a resolution in a relational, care-based ethics and a contextual approach to
knowledge, or, at least, a more satisfactory response than is offered by
much traditional epistemology, justice-based ethics and political
philosophy.
Furthermore, feminists have been at work developing a theoretical underpinning for a care ethic. One I find most promising is based on the idea
of a practice and the norms that underlie practices of care. For example,
Sara Ruddick, in her book Maternal Thinking 31 looks at practices of mothering. She asks, in effect, whether there are some universal aims of those
who engage in the practice of mothering-essentially, what it is that mothering persons (a role which she believes can be filled by men and women
29. Gn.L1GAr-;, supra note 17. See Linda Kerber et aI., On "In a Different Voice": An Interdisciplinary Forum, II, no. 2 SIGr-;S 304 (1986), for a searching look at Gilligan's work. See also
MAPPING THE MORAL DOMAIN (Carol Gilligan, Janie Victoria Ward & Jill McLean Taylor with
Betty Bardige eds., 1988).
30. See generally HELD, supra note 23; Joan C. Tronto, Beyond Gender Difference to a
Theory of Care, 12, no. 4 SIGNS 644 (1987); Annette C. Baier, The Needfor More than .Justice, in
JUSTICE AND CARE: ESSENTIAL READINGS IN FEMINIST ETHICS 47 (Virginia Held ed., 1995). See
generally MARGARET URBAN WALKER, MORAL U:-IDERSTANDINGS: A FEMINIST STUDY IN ETHICS
(1998), for useful explications of this point.
31. RUDDICK, supra note 23.
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alike) do when they mother adequately and what ends are served by their
actions. She identifies three sorts of endeavors that are critical to the practice of mothering: preservative love, fostering growth or development, and
socializing for acceptance into the community. When people engage in raising an infant into adulthood, they must first preserve the life of the child
and they must do so with some loving care or their child fails to survive and
thrive. They must allow for and enable the growth and development of that
child-otherwise they are not raising a child. And they must prepare the
child for the social world the child will encounter. Without such preparation, both the grown child and the community suffer. These essential elements of the practice of mothering give rise to a set of virtues and vices
(which Ruddick calls "temptations").32 That is, the telos of the mothering
practice itself informs the moral norms necessary for the best examples of
that practice. 33
Care, in instances other than mothering, is a practice as well. Or more
precisely, care is either an end or a means to other ends in a number of
practices, among them are nursing, friendship, welfare policies, teaching,
looking after someone who is ill, tending to the frail elderly, and assisting
disabled people-to name a few examples.3 4 In all these practices of care,
the caregiver must assume a relational self, a self that is highly empathetic
to another and considers the other's wellbeing as (at least to a certain extent) part of her own. Care ethicists do not argue that a relational self is of
value simply because women develop such relational selves, but because
the practices of care require it, if the care is going to be good care. Excessive individualism impedes the possibility of providing good care. On the
other hand, secular feminists tend to see the value of also holding fast to the
equal worth of each individual, and the importance of not neglecting the
needs of one in meeting the needs of another. Total self-sacrifice, the annihilation of the self in favor of the cared for, is neither demanded by the
practice of care nor is it justifiable, for one can see that a relationship requires two selves, not one self in which the other is subsumed and consumed. A care ethic is not a mere reaction to individualism, but it tempers
individualism by insisting that the relationships in which we stand help to
constitute the individual we have become, are now and will be in the future.
Religious feminists may well ground a care ethic in religious beliefs,
and see the relationality of the self as founded in the relationship of the self
to the deity, but that is not the only way to conceive of these ideas. They
may well take a different attitude about sacrifice because the notion of the
gift of self plays an important role in the way religious feminists view a
relationship as mediated through the deity. But secular feminists are wary
32. [d. at 25, 30.
33. See also Alison M. Jaggar, Ethics Naturalized: Feminism's Contribution to Moral Epistemology, 31, no. 5 METAPHILOSOPHY 452 (2000).
34. ?ETA BOWDEr-i, CARIr-iG: GENDER-SS'ISITIVE ETHICS (1997).

2007]

SEARCHING FOR AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS

479

of calls on women to sacrifice, for too often they have had little say in that
demand, and for too long the glorification of self-sacrifice has kept women
in a subordinate position where their well-being counted for less than those
whom they served. Perhaps feminists of faith have the understanding that
such sacrifice does not go unacknowledged. There are resources in religious
doctrine that can protect women from the exploitation that such sacrifice
has tended to entail. Secular feminists are more concerned with ensuring
that the social obligations to the caregiver and to the one in need of care are
firmly in place. We are interested in legislation that helps ensure that women (or men doing care work) are not called upon to forego their own wellbeing as they tend to another: legislation such as paid leave to do care,
financial remuneration for familial caregiving, workplace protections and
flexibility that allow people both to care for loved ones and have fulfilling
work, respite facilities for families doing long-term care for disabled,
chronically ill or frail family members and so forth. To the extent that religious feminists can join secular feminists, we will be stronger in fighting for
these demands.
But what, some here have asked, can be the grounds that secular feminists have for claiming that society has an obligation to support care work?
Don't we have to appeal to a religious understanding of our obligations to
the weak and vulnerable? I would argue and have argued that there are good
secular grounds for such obligations?5 I appeal to an enlarged conception
of reciprocity. I cannot go into detail in the time allotted, but I can sketch
the argument. I begin with our inevitable dependency-with the fact that
we are all totally dependent at some time in our life, during infancy, serious
illness, frail old age, and if we have a permanent and serious disability we
may be very dependent all through our lives. If we consider that we form
social relations not only to engage with equals-in economic exchange,
social intercourse, cooperative enterprises, et cetera-but also to help care
for one another through periods of inevitable dependency, then the dependent person is the beginning and end point in a series of obligations: the
obligation to the dependent child; the obligation to the caregiver to enable
her both to care for the dependent and herself; the larger social obligation to
support those who support the caregiver; and the obligation of each to a
social order that will care for us as we again become dependent. Consider
the following diagram: 36

35. Eva Feder Kittay, At Home with My Daughter, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: Ex·
PLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS (Leslie Pickering Francis
& Anita Silvers eds., 2000); KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR, supra note 23; Kittay, When Care Is Just
and Justice Is Caring, supra note 23.
36. See Eva Feder Kittay, A Feminist Public Ethic of Care Meets the New Communitarian
Family Policy, Ill, no. 3 ETHICS 523, 534 (2001), for a fuller discussion of this diagram.
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The diagram I have displayed is meant to capture the expanded notion
of reciprocity I have in mind. At the center is the fully dependent individual. If we do, in fact, create social structures and political associations at
least in part to allow us to care for dependents, then: (1) We expect a dependency worker/caregiver to care for the dependent; (2) Insofar as the dependency worker in turn becomes dependent as she attends to a fully dependent
individual, others, (whom I call providers) must step in to support her in her
caregiving; (3) Providers are in fact dependent on larger social structures,
such as the state to enable the provider to procure resources needed to assist
the dependency worker, i.e. providers need jobs or other sources of income.
(Note that sometimes the same individual occupies both roles-but this difficult situation generally is very costly to the dependency worker/provider
and to the dependent individual-unless many other support structures are
in place.); (4) The relationship between providers and the state is a reciprocal dependency as the state, in turn, depends on those who help create the
resources, that is, the taxpayers; (5) But those who are the taxpayers have at
some point been the beneficiaries of the care of a dependency worker and
may need to do dependency work or may return to a state of full dependency; (6) As the taxpayers have benefited from another's care, and as such
care was made possible by the contributions of the caregiver and the providers, the taxpayers have a reciprocal duty to enable others to care and provide support to caregivers.
At each turn then, dependencies incur obligations, which are, in fact,
obligations of reciprocity in an expanded sense that allow each one to receive care when that care is needed, and to permit the caregiver to care
without depleting herself. I think what I have here adumbrated is a form of
justice that we can invoke to make claims for a collective responsibility for
care.
I engaged in these lengthy expositions in order to make the case that
there can be secular grounds for arguing for the relationality of the self,
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contextual thinking, an ethic of care and a societal obligation to care. In
assuming what I take to be a number of shared beliefs, the secular feminist
is not making baseless assumptions any more than is the religious feminist.
Once again the point is that a certain belief may be grounded in different
theoretical positions, some of which may be religious, others secular.
Now you might reply that how we ground our beliefs is surely not
indifferent to the actual content of the belief. Well, yes, to some extent it is,
and no, to some extent it's not. Professor Failinger tells us that Lutheran
feminists see the justification for a contextual approach to knowledge, and a
relational approach to ethics in ''finitum capax infiniti," the finite is the
bearer of the infinite. There are many ways to interpret this very idea. For
the Lutheran, it is Christ who is the exemplar. 37 Yet a Spinozist such as
myself can also hold that the finite is the bearer of the infinite, for according
to Spinoza each mode expresses all infinite attributes of God. 38 A secular
feminist care ethicist, such as myself, can see in the work of caring for a
singular finite individual, the ethical meaning of caring relationships wherever they occur. And the contextual way of knowing 39 that secular feminists
argue for is derived from an understanding of the relational self, the caring
work and the ethical attitude needed to do such caring work. It's not evident
to me that the ethical attitude embedded in the labor of care-a labor which
is the foundation of all human life-is an unapt or unworthy starting point
from which to derive the truth of our fundamental connectedness and the
inextricably contextual nature of life and thought.
Or, again we may tum to the work of Professor Failinger. She asks
about the difficult situation that women find themselves in wherein they can
only achieve their professional goals by employing other, poorer and less
privileged women to take on the labor that they would traditionally be
charged with. She says, "professional women in these situations can acknowledge their responsibility for those whom they employ. They can begin to confess their own indifference to the need, and exploitation, of those
who serve them as domestic and service and child care workers."4o
I agree. But she also writes: "if women can honestly recognize the
inherent sinfulness and finitude that marks women's lives, they can begin to
be honest about the costs of their many callings." I am less concerned with
the sinfulness of women in this regard, than with the paucity of economic
alternatives, the structuring of the workplace, the devaluing of care labor,
the poor pay we, as a society, offer for care workers. If attributing the moral
failure and lack of political will to change the conditions for care workers to
the agent's "sinfulness" stand in the way of feminists of all stripes working
37. Failinger, supra note 28, at 411.
38. A "mode," says Spinoza, is a modification of an attribute. God has infinite attributes, of
which we humans know only body and mind. See SPINOZA, supra note I, at 102.
39. Stabile, supra note 7, at 435-38.
40. Failinger, supra note 28, at 424.
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together to alter our policies, then this way of talking presents a problem.
But I don't see why it needs to. Where we can speak of a certain behavior in
secular terms as a moral failure, we can also speak of the sinfulness of the
behavior. But a moral failure on a societal level requires not so much that
we pray for our sins and for forgiveness, as that we work together to redress
the moral harm.
IV.

FEMINISM AND THE FAMILy-AN IMPASSE?

And now we have come to what is perhaps the most difficult and contentious part of this talk. I think there is a very genuine division between the
secular dependency or care feminists and some of the work that we heard
today. Most of the issues bear on questions of the family and sexuality.
Contraception and abortion should also be included here, but I am going to
set aside these latter thorny issues, as much ink (and blood) has already
been spilled on the issues of abortion and contraception.
I do want to speak about how religious and secular feminists clash
over the family, about which much less has been said. Professor Stabile's
discussion of secular feminism often conflates the views of feminists who
accept liberal individualism and who exhort women to be "independent,"
with those feminists who stress relationality, dependency, and care. Sometimes she reads the positions of the latter through a lens of the former-for
example, when she talks about how secular feminist views concerning relationality are merely reactive against individualism. In doing so, I believe
that Professor Stabile exaggerates differences between a religious feminist
such as herself and a secular care feminist such as myself. While care feminists reject individualism and stress the importance of dependence and interdependence, they do not necessarily embrace the traditional family as the
alternative to individualism. Instead, we question why the concept of "family" is predicated on a particular form of sexual bonding instead of the binding nature of caring and care labor. 41 We are not trying to "reinvent the
family" or say that the family is a mere social construction and so can be
subject to any form we wish. We are asking, what is the work of the family
in the life of a society? The answer is that the work of the family is the
work of dependency care. Thus, care feminists take the notion of family in a
broad sense as being the social technology by which we take care of dependency needs, including (but not exclusively) the dependency needs of
children.
Often the family is intergenerational, but sometimes it's not. Two
adults who have committed to be there for each other 'in the long haul' and
to care for each other should the need arise can constitute family in this
41.

MARTHA ALBERTSON FI"IEMAN, THE NEl:TERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND

OTHER TVvT~TlETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES

supra note 23.

(1995);

Kittay,

supra note 36;

KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR,
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sense. Often the dependent is a child, but the dependent may be a disabled
person or an elderly person. I would argue that it doesn't matter whether the
unit in which a child is being cared for is comprised of a man and a woman
in a monogamous relationship. The important thing is that the child is well
cared for. Of equal importance is the societal recognition of its responsibility to ensure that this unit is enabled to give, at minimum, adequate care. A
decent society is one in which all who are in need of dependency care receive it. But a decent society is also one that does not achieve this goal by
free-riding on those who undertake the responsibility to give care. That is, a
decent society will ensure that the caregiver is herself adequately cared for.
Professor Stabile, Sister Allen and others argue for the traditional
structure of the family. They stress the intergenerational nature of the family. They aver that family must be understood as a monogamous, heterosexual unit-and give various theological arguments for this position,
arguments that, as far as I understand, have much to do with the well-being
of the child. 42 Among these are arguments for the propositions that a child
must have a man and a woman as adults in their lives, and that the adults
must remain in a relationship not rent by divorce. Sister Allen bases her
position on the more general idea of complementarity-that as a man and a
women are complements to one another and each supplies something the
other cannot, the child requires the presence of both.43
I question many of these propositions. Let us take the issue of complementarity. Even if you accept that men and women have two very distinct
ways of being in the world, and as long as we continue to live in a sexist
society I think the jury will remain out on the truth of that claim, there is no
reason why a child can receive those two ways of being in the world only in
a monogamous marriage. Were we to have more men in caregiving work,
especially in early childcare work and in early education, then a child raised
with a single mom or two moms would still have the benefit of experiencing these two ways of being in the world. If more effort were made to
counsel couples who divorce to maintain a non-antagonistic sharing of child
care arrangements, the child would maintain the benefits of having more
than one adult responsible for its well-being. Furthermore, empirical studies
have shown time and time again that children raised by homosexual couples
fare just as well as children raised in traditional heterosexual marriages, as
long as the homosexual parents are comfortable with their sexuality.44 A
more accepting social attitude toward homosexuality would then contribute
42. Professor Stabile approvingly notes, "Por these reasons, the Church sees as a blight and a
shadow on family: divorce, polygamy and homosexual unions. All of these are threats to 'the
community of maniage and the family.'" Stabile, supra note 7, at 440. See also Allen, Analogy,
Law, and the Workplace, supra note 15, at 359.
43. See Allen, supra note 15, at 359, for Sister Allen's discussion on "integral gender
complementarity."
44. See Vivien Ray & Robin Gregory, School Experiences of the Children of Lesbian and
Gay Parents, 59 PAM. MATTERS 28 (2001), for a large number of studies.
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to the well-being of children raised by homosexual couples. The findings
regarding the question of whether children are best served in single parent
homes or in homes where both parents are present even when there is strife
or domestic abuse may be inconclusive,45 but the indications are that some
of the negative effects on children when a couple divorces are due to the
diminished income and standard of living of the mother, who almost always
has responsibility for the exclusive care (if not the exclusive custody) of the
child. 46 Better economic protections for the custodial parent, more equal
wages for women, and support for parents raising children alone could do
much to alleviate that poverty and offset many of the negative consequences of divorce on children.
It is hard for this secular feminist to understand why, when religious
feminists want to emphasize relationality, the value of caring labor, equal
dignity of each individual, the importance of raising children and caring for
those who cannot care for themselves, the emphasis is not on the units of
dependency relations rather than the family as understood and constituted
by patriarchy. So here there is a real divide. Predictably, I would urge the
religious feminists to come over to our side, for in my perspective, it is far
more consistent with all their other feminist positions and attitudes towards
care.
But if changes in social policy that have to do, say, with poverty and
women's work conditions, can help the conditions of children who live in
nontraditional families, then why should different attitudes toward the family on the part of secular and religious feminists enter as a dividing wedge?
Why should we be divided when we agree that the important thing is to
ensure that our dependents and our caring relationships are supported and
protected?
Let me return then to the idea of an overlapping consensus. What is the
overlapping consensus pertaining to families? I concede that at one time an
overlapping consensus in this country (and in many other parts of the
world) was to be found in the idea that children ought to be raised in a
monogamous marriage. But if that view still holds a rhetorical edge, it no
45. See EDUCATION REFORMS AND STUDENTS AT RISK: A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE OF
THE ART JANUARY 1994 (Robert Rossi & Alesia Montgomery eds., 1994), for a review of the
literature conducted by the U.S. Department of Education; E. Mavis Hetherington & Margaret
Stanley-Hagan. The Adjustment of Children with Divorced Parents: A Risk and Resiliency Perspective, 40 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 129 (1999). See Daniel Silitsky, Correlates of
Psychosocial Adjustment in Adolescents from Divorced Families, 26, no. 112 J. DIVORCE & RE·
MARRIAGE 151 (1997), for a study that finds no significant difference in the psychological wellbeing of adolescents. See Charles Lockhart et aI .• Family Structure and Children's Needs: The
Test Case of Moral Development, 31, no. 1/2 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 39 (1999), for the
impact of divorce on children's moral development that claims inconclusive results.
46. Richard E. Behrman & Linda Sandham Quinn, Children and Divorce: Overview and
Analysis, 4, no. 1 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 4 (1994). See also Paul R. Amato, Children's Adjustment
to Divorce: Theories. Hypotheses, and Empirical Support, 55, no. 1 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 23
(1993).
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longer matches the reality of family life. About one in four households in
the United States (and not only in the United States) consist of married
couples with children in monogamous heterosexual marriages. 47 In many
parts of our nation and in many parts of Europe, we have come to the understanding that gay and lesbian couples can do an excellent job in nurturing their children. We've seen those children flourish. 48 These changes on
the ground have led to public discussions and have opened the question of
the suitability of gay and lesbian couples raising children to public rational
deliberation. Some of us might determine that this is not the family we
want. We might hold onto religious qualms about the suitability of such
families. That private conscience is given its place in political liberalism.
But if we're going to work together as feminists, we need to focus on those
positions for which we can find an overlapping consensus. And even in
those areas where we disagree, we can find the grounds for forging an
alliance.
V.

QUESTION AND ANSWER PORTION OF THE PANEL

Schiltz:
Thank you very much. I'm sure that there are a lot of things that a
lot of people want to say and I know that we don't have very
much time for questions. But I thought I would just try. One thing
that has occurred to me .... What I think we're talking about ...
is a form of sacrifice, and what I noted in the discussion yesterday
is that in a lot of the secular feminist perspectives [there] is an
extreme discomfort with this notion that there should be any lack
of reciprocity in the sacrifices that we make, and I see from the
two religious [perspectives] that were represented today ... comfort with that notion that there should be things you do for which
there is no repayment, and it was clear just in the language of the
two presentations where "sacrifice" was used by Professor Failinger and Professor Stabile, and from Dr. Kittay we didn't hear
that. We heard and saw the chart ... saying you are going to get
back at the end of your life what you are giving now at the beginning of your life. So I wondered if anybody has any comment on
that?

47. "Punctuating a fundamental change in American family life, married couples with children now occupy fewer than one in every four households-a share that has been slashed in half
since 1960 and is the lowest ever recorded by the census." Blaine Harden, Numbers Drop for the
Married with Children, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2007, at A03.
48. Ellen C. Perrin & Comm. on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health, American Academy of Pediatrics Technical Report: Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex
Parents, 109, no. 2 PEDIATRICS 341 (2002).
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Kittay:
There are two questions here, one about reciprocity and one about
self-sacrifice. And they are connected insofar as the idea of selfsacrifice assumes that one acts for the benefit of another without
the expectation of a return, that is, of a reciprocal action on the
part of the party whose well-being I promoted at my own expense. The notion of reciprocity that I'm working with is not one
where I expect to benefit from the actions of the one to whom I
devoted myself. Nor is it one where I expect to get in the same
measure that I gave. It is a very wide circle of reciprocity. I give
to "a," "a" gives to "b," "b" gives to "c," etc., and if I am in need,
I will want to get what I need, but it may not be from "a" or "b"
or "c" but from someone else in the reciprocal chain. And so it
might well look as if I will be engaging in actions that appear
self-sacrificing. But carework often requires that we set aside our
own immediate needs. Yet that is not a situation that we generally
can sustain, nor is it especially fair to careworkers, even mothers,
to always and forever set aside their own interests and desirestheir own selves. As I noted earlier, relationality requires that
there be two (or more) relata, two or more selves. If one person
submerges herself entirely for the benefit of the other, there is no
longer a relationship. This is a point made well by Carol Gilligan. 49 It is also beautifully and powerfully made by Simone de
Beauvoir in speaking of love relationships in her chapter "The
Woman in Love" in The Second Sex. 50 The reciprocity then is not
one that presumes that I will get back at the end of my life what I
put in earlier in my life. Rather, I have argued, that non-exploitative caregiving requires that others attend to the needs that arise
for the caregiver and help provide her with the resources she will
need to take care of another and to assure her own well-being. If
she, at some point, requires extensive care, then she too should be
able to avail herself of such care, a situation by the way that often
does not prevail today for many women who have spent their
lives caring for others.
Failinger:
My sort of favorite philosopher is the Jewish philosopher
Emanuelle Levinas and in his conception all of us stand, if you
will, beneath another person, an infinite other person who is
standing over us in his or her need and we are in relationship to
each other that way. So the command of the other person, he says,
holds me hostage to his need. And that's how I look at the problem of sacrifice. As ... acknowledged in my talk, people exploit
49.
50.

GILLIGAN,

supra note 17.

SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX

(H.M. Parshley trans., Vintage 1989) (1949).
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each other, and part of our common responsibility is to call people on the exploitation whether it is the husband exploiting a wife
or a worker exploiting his situation or an employer exploiting her
situation. So ... that's the dark side of our reality as human beings, but that does not obviate the fact that this other person,
every other person, stands over me in his absolute nakedness and
his need calling to me and commanding me to respond to him, in
Levinas's words.
Kittay:
Okay, my own views are very close to Levinas's here. I mean I
argue that the reason that we have to respond ... to a dependent
person is precisely because of that person's need, a need that this
person cannot meet on their own and because we are in a position
(perhaps a unique position) to answer to that need. But that's true
of all, not only those who are children or other inevitable dependents, so it's part of what we are as part of the human community.
The problem is asking for exploitative self-sacrifice. That's where
I think we have to say "no." In my book, Love's Labor, I consider
whether a slave, who has traveled North with his master and finds
himself with a master who has taken ill and may die, has any
obligation to care for his ill master. I think it's a very difficult
question. I think we can conceive of the situation in several ways.
On the one hand, there is a human relationship in which one person's neediness calls for a response from another human being,
but there's also that other relationship, of master and slave, a genuinely exploitative relationship. That is a relationship that, T believe, the slave has a right to walk away from because it is an
unjust relation.
Schiltz:
I think that what I'd probably add, and this is really the conclusion that we were coming to the other night, is that a lot of this is
how we are using certain words, because "exploitative sacrifice"
is not what religious or secular feminists want. I mean, "exploitative sacrifice" by definition reduces my own dignity as a human
person, so I think that it really is an issue of how we are using
certain terms. I think we have time for maybe two questions.
There's one hand up.
Question:
I have several questions for all of you, but I will limit one question to Dr. Kittay. Urn, you talked, and all of you talked about the
differences between secular feminists and faith-based feminists,
but I never heard you articulate how you came to the conclusion
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that there is equal dignity. What's the basis for that equal dignity?
And why is it that a perpetually dependent being, whether it be an
unborn child or a severely retarded child, urn, who's going to
have a lifetime of perpetual dependence, why are they entitled to
this equal dignity do you think?
Kittay:
The usual response in philosophy for why we all have equal dignity is that we are all rational beings that are capable of conceiving of our own good and then forming our own ends, that we are
ends in ourselves. I object to this because basing equal dignity on
rational capacities excludes people like my daughter. In other
words, I argue that the basis of that equal dignity lies in our neediness as beings that require care and that can give care. Each and
every person who survives is given care-cannot survive without
care, even minimal care. At the same time, humans are uniquely
beings who care not only for their offspring, but for others when
they are ill, disabled or frail. Only humans set up institutional
structures to assure that we can provide care. When we recognize
another as having human dignity, we recognize that this is someone that another valued enough to provide the care required to
survive-that valuing, I believe is what we honor as we ascribe
dignity to person. I also argue for a very different conception of
equality, which again is not dependent on human rationality. Instead I have put forward the idea that our equality resides in the
fact that we are each some mother's child. In making these statements, I can't say that I speak for all secular feminists. Many
feminists don't agree with the idea of a "care ethic." Why, you
ask, is someone who is forever dependent due that care? If we are
all inevitably dependent at some point in our lives and some may
be or become inevitably dependent for all or for the remainder of
their lives, then any society will require structures to care for dependents if it is to continue beyond one generation, and a decent
society will not allow dependency needs to go unmet-however
long those needs continue. I believe that is part of our conception
of a decent society. When we see people who cannot take care of
themselves lying in the streets or rotting away in an institution
where they are left to lie in their own feces, we feel ashamed and
even outraged. This may not be a response in societies that are in
a condition of great scarcity. It is a response in societies where
there is sufficient affluence to care for those in need of care and
which have a conception of the equal dignity of each human
being.

